There is serious concern that the sale of new cars in the UK will be reduced in the coming year because superstitious people want to avoid the 13 numberplate. Practical people may dismiss this as credulous nonsense but the prejudices of consumers, right or wrong, are still in their own right economic facts with which business has to deal.

In any case, even among the practical – especially among the practical – it is difficult to find anyone with serious business experience who is unworried about the year ahead. The euro looks shakier than ever. Italy’s technocratic but unelected government has retained the confidence of the markets but is in its last days: it will probably be replaced either by a leftist coalition under a former communist or possibly by the return by Silvio Berlusconi – neither a force for stability. In Spain, a new government trying to cope manfully with the consequences of its predecessor’s free spending faces huge unemployment. France’s attempt to develop an alternative to German austerity has been undermined by its reliance on a 75% top tax rate. The flight of that epitome of all things French, Gerard Depardieu, across the border to Belgium is symbolic of a general flight of confidence.

Any one of these three giants going the way of Greece and Ireland would be a greater catastrophe than both the latter put together – and any or all of the three could go next year. It will be a minor miracle if none of them does.

Before that, there is the small matter of America’s “fiscal cliff” to avoid. In a squalid bargain that does credit to no one, Democratic President Barack Obama and Congressional Republicans put off tough decisions on the budget deficit until after the elections. Now the elections are over, and tax cuts passed under the younger President Bush are set to expire. Almost no one in Washington wants that to happen, but President Obama, flushed with victory after his re-election, has initiated a very dangerous game of chicken.

He says he will veto the renewal if it includes the tax cuts on higher earners. Republicans who control the House of Representatives are pledged to apply the tax cuts to everyone. Whether they were wise to make such a pledge is beside the point: the political fact of the matter is that everyone remembers how the elder President Bush never recovered from going back on his equally unviable pledge of “no new taxes.”

Compromise is still possible, but there is very little trust and goodwill between the two sides. In any case, this is no way to run a global economy. Whether it is initiated in America, France, Italy, Spain, or one of a dozen other danger points, a crisis in 2013 is more likely than not, and this one will be down to the politicians, not the bankers and borrowers as it was in 2008. Hold on: it may be a rough ride in the coming year.

The euro crisis has now claimed a centre-left Prime Minister in Greece and a centre-right one in Italy. Leftist Spain is keeping a low profile, trying very hard not to be noticed – almost certainly in vain.

Yet it would be a mistake to write off the Mediterranean economies as “all the same”. Greece is a true basket case, a welfare state in the literal sense – a state dependant on welfare – underwritten mainly by the Germans. Italy, however, is in many ways a strong economy, at least in parts, with lots of viable businesses and an understanding of the need for international marketing. The present crisis is all about past deficits rather than future prospects.

Italy’s underlying problems go back a long way: weak governments since the beginning of the Republic encouraged structural inefficiencies. As a result, public sector debt has grown out of control under governments of both left and right. This could be ignored in the years of growth, but not since 2008.

Silvio Berlusconi attempted some reforms, but half-heartedly and largely without success.  So the markets rose a little on the news of his resignation – only to fall dramatically when realisation set in: If Berlusconi cannot deliver reform, who can?

There is no one in Italian politics with anything like Berlusconi’s power and personal dynamism. Although he has lost the high approval ratings he once enjoyed, the fact that he ever had such large majorities makes him almost unique among the Republic’s Prime Ministers, and he still has a larger block of parliamentarians and voters loyal to him than any other Italian politician. He might object to the comparison, but he was the most powerful Italian leader since Mussolini. He delivered an unparalleled period of relative stability in Italian politics. If he must share some of the blame for some of Italy’s failure to reform, he also deserves at least part of the credit for her recent prosperity.

Largely portrayed in the English speaking media as a buffoon, he is nevertheless a self-made multi-millionaire and understood business – unlike the career politicians and bureaucrats of the European Establishment, who never embraced him. His clowning led many to underestimate him: his road to power was over their political graves. He was a product of the openly corrupt Italy of the 70s, but he did not create the system that made him and which he exploited so skilfully. An unelected technocrat is unlikely to succeed where he failed.

Many Italians say openly that only a Mussolini can sort their country out. The EU seems keen to take on that role. For all his many, many faults, Silvio Berlusconi may yet go down as having been the last, best hope of Italian democracy.

At the very least, the eurozone will weaker without him – and a lot duller.

In our recent podcast on the euro, we discussed the possibility that the preservation of the European single currency might depend on weaker nations, such as Greece, leaving it.

That possibility is now being taken seriously by the markets.

It is, however, curious that they expressed their concern by devaluing the euro against the dollar. Logic dictates that the euro should be worth more if it does not have to underwrite the budget deficit of the spendthrift Greek government.

It might be the best thing that could happen to the euro if Greece left it for a while, followed by Portugal and perhaps even Spain. Those are the countries which ran up the worst government deficits – despite the euro’s supposedly strict rules – and which are still reluctant to tackle them. Ireland also ran up a horrendous deficit, but seems prepared to take firm measures.

Needless to say, there are vociferous official denials. Equally needless to say, those denials are not being believed.

The authors of this blog are not currency speculators, nor are we qualified to advise others on currency speculation, but, if we were, we might be tempted by the prospect of putting surplus cash into euros.

Something has to be done. Something is going to be done. If the Greek government and the other basket cases do not do it, someone else will. The Germans are getting impatient. When they act, the euro will be strengthened – and they will act soon if no one else does.

Just in case our last couple of posts are misinterpreted as another case of impecunious Brits taking jealous pleasure at the impoverishment of our once-wealthy American cousins, let us make it clear that we have a much bigger problem on our own doorstep.

The American problem is that recovery is too slow, but there is still recovery and the worst of the crisis is probably past, at least for the time being. The European Union, on the other hand, has not really addressed its deeper structural problem, and is therefore a crisis waiting to happen.

In fairness, the euro, the common currency of most EU states, is a symptom, rather than the cause, of this problem. There was always a hole in the deal: the euro is only as strong as its weakest economy. In particular, lax fiscal discipline on the part of a single Eurozone government undermines the whole currency. The mechanisms for imposing discipline were weak from the beginning, but everyone ignored them when times were good.

That is no longer an option. The party is over and the bill has just been presented. The EU, however, has even less leadership than the USA. The European response to the inability of overindulged states like Greece, Spain, and Ireland to pay what they owe has been described, elegantly but all too accurately, as “agreeing a funding mechanism but not funding it”.

Nationalised banks in Ireland are bust. This in turn puts pressure on the sovereign debt of the Irish government. Much of that debt forms a key part of the balance sheets of foreign banks – not least in Britain, which may therefore suffer despite the UK not being a Eurozone member.

This could impact on the whole economy. The equity market, still a little too bullish under the circumstances, may be in denial, but the rising price of gold suggests a lot of the smart money is playing it safe in anticipation of another crash.

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the Americans have some right to feel smug. The first phase of the infamous Troubled Asset Relief Programme – that is to say the initial bail out of the banks, as opposed to the later unnecessary “stimulus packages” – has been a qualified success. Buying up toxic assets, as opposed to nationalising banks, means the government has been able to get away with a quick “in and out”, with no longer term commitments on either side. Most of the American banks repaid the government very quickly in order to get it out of their hair, and stability was restored to the US banking system within months. Those who still carp about it can see the alternative in Ireland.

Remember 2008? Some people would like to forget it. They were the ones running around, predicting – in some cases without bothering to disguise their glee – the end of capitalism.

Some of us kept our heads and said “This too shall pass” – as, of course, it did. Yet the prophets of doom remain in high-salaried jobs with the mainstream media and government departments.

The same people were also very fond of lecturing us on how Spanish banks fared so much better in the crisis of 2008 because they were regulated more comprehensively.

This may be another of the pronouncements they would like to forget.

The EU has just carried out a series of “stress tests” on European banks. The much maligned British banks passed, but five Spanish banks did not.

This should not surprise anyone: more regulators do not mean better regulation – and regulation does not in itself instil a sense of responsibility.

Yet there is a deeper point. Despite over a dozen major crises, the West has enjoyed phenomenal growth since the development of modern capitalism in the late 17^th Century. Most of that growth has been due to the relatively high-risk investment strategies of banks following the “Anglo-Saxon model”. The alternative, investing mainly in government securities, would have left us in the Middle Ages, without the growth in private enterprise that is the foundation of modern prosperity.

The irony is that investment in government securities is not the safe option it appears. If the bankers of Spain and Greece thought the government bonds of their own countries were a firm foundation for their portfolios, they have been proved horribly wrong. It might actually be a safer strategy to broaden a portfolio with a few higher-risk loans.

This blog, which looks at things from the perspective of small business, treats bankers with caution, but we cannot deny that we need them – and, although they will never admit it, they need us. It is in our interest and theirs to keep banks lending to business, even when it seems riskier, on a superficial level, than sticking to government bonds or building up reserves. Business and banks should unite – for once – and speak out in defence of the “Anglo-Saxon model”. The evidence is on our side.